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1 INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, consrirutional rights apply in the public sphere but not in the 
private sphere. In other words, private ac[Ors were not bound by human 
rights. Alrhough often associated with the narural rights theory, the dis-
tinction between the public and the private in the application of human 
rights 'anredates modern liberalism by more than two millennia." 
This tradirional position has also been mainrained in inrernarional law.' 
Thus, non-state ac[Ors, such as transnarional corporarions, cannot be 
found liable in internarionallaw for violating human rights. The realisation 
that non-state ac[Ors have become more influenrial inrernationally than 
was previously the case and that these ac[Ors have been implicated in a 
wide range of gross violarions of human rights in various parts of the 
world has strengthened the call for binding inrernarional standards for 
these ac[Ors. J However, resistance [0 establishing such a framework is still 
strong. Thus, efforts iniriated in August 2003 by the UN Sub-Commission 
for the Protection and Promorion of Human Rights [0 adopt the UN Norms 
on the Responsibiliries of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enrerprises with regard [0 Human Rights (UN Norms), have been stalled.
4 
Instead of adopring the Norms as an UN declararion or treaty, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights appoinred a Special Represenrative of the 
Secretary General on Human R.ights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises to undertake further research in[O existing 
initiatives and standards for holding these ac[Ors accounrable for human 
rights, both at domestic and international levels. 
* I would like to thank Professors Sandra Liebenberg, Jeremy Sarkin and Jacques de Ville 
and the referees for useful comments made on an earlier version of this article. 
I Thornton M 'The cartography of public and private' in Thornton M (ed) Public and 
private: Feminist legal debates ( I 995) 2. 
2 See Charlesworth H 'Worlds apart: Public/private distinctions in international law' in 
Margaret Thornton M (ed) Public and private: Feminist legal debates (1995) 243. 
3 See, e.g., Orentlicher D & Gelan T 'Public law, private actors: The impact of human rights 
on business investors in China' (1993) 14 Northwest journal oj International Law and 
Business I at 66; Saunders L 'Rich and rare are the gems they war: Holding De Beers 
accountable for trading conflict diamonds' (200 I) 24 Fordham International Law journal 
1402; Skogly S 'Complexities in human rights protection: Actors and rights involved in 
tile Ogoni conflict in Nigeria' (1997) 15 Netherlands Quarterly oj Human Rights 47. 
4 See Chirwa D 'The long march to binding obligations of transnational corporations in 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY /)( DEVELOPMENT 
This article seeks [0 contribute to this ongoing investigation by showing 
that comparative constitutional jurisprudence points [Owards an increas-
ing recognition of the relevance or applicability of these rights to private 
ac[Ors. The constitutions of five countries (United States, Canada, Ger-
many, Ireland and South Africa) will form the main subject of discussion. 
The US Constitution is one of the oldest constitutions, whose lifespan 
extends over a period of 200 years, The Canadian Constitution is a rela-
tively recent one adopted in 1982. However, both of these constitutions 
are traditional in the sense that they limit the conception of duties gener-
ated by human rights [0 negative obli~ations, and do not permit the 
application of rights to non-state actors. Nevertheless, it will be argued 
that even traditional constitutions such as these recognise that private 
conduct may, in certain limited circumstances, fall within the reach of 
constitutional rights. The jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany also establishes that constitutional rights are relevant in the 
private sphere, German constitutional law is well known for what has 
come to be called the 'doctrine of Drittwirkung' (third party effect of basic 
rights), This doctrine has been in application for more than half a century 
and has been adopted by a range of other countries including Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland and Japan/ and by the European Court of Human Rights. 8 
Both the Constitutions of Ireland and South Africa permit the application 
of constitutional rights between non-state actors, These constitutions 
represent potential models of full horizontal application of constitutional 
rights. 
2 THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
As mentioned earlier, the Constitution of the United States is emblematic 
of traditional constitutions in the sense that it is intended to bind the state 
only. The human rights provisions under this Constitution have no direct 
application between private actors'" This position has been encapsulated 
in what has come to be popularly known as the 'state action doctrine', 
According to American constitutional theory, private actors are not bound 
by constitutional rights unless the conduct of those actors qualifies as 
'state action', In Virginia v Rives, 10 for example, the United States Supreme 
Court stated that 'the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
5 For [he US see Unlled Slates v Cruikshank 92 US 514, 554 - 55. 318 (] 875), For 
Canada see Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986J 
2 S,c'R, 573,9 B,c'LR. (2d) 273, 595 CDolphin Delivery' cited to S.c'R.). 
6 For the US see, for example, Shelley v Kraemer 334 Us. I; DeShaney v Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services 489 U,S. 189, 196 (1989); for Canada see Dolphin 
Delivery at 595. 
7 Barak A 'Constitutional human rights and private law' in Friedmann D /)( Barak-Erez D 
(eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 13 at 22. For Japan see also Horan M 'Comem-
porary conscimLionalism and legal relationships between individuals' (1976) Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly 848, 864 866, 
8 See Clapham A 'The "Dri[[wirkung" of the Convention' in Marscher F et al (eds) The 
European system for the protection of human rights (1993) 163. 
9 See United States v Cruikshank (fn 5 above) 554 55, 










































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Constitution ... all have reference to State action exclusively, and not to 
any action of private individuals'. II This principle was reiterated in the 
Civil Rights Cases, where it was held that 'it is state action of a particular 
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not 
the subject-matter of the Amendment'. 
The jurisprudence on state action defies coherence and its scope has 
been the subject of a long drawn-out academic debate, I; However, some 
principles within the maze of this jurisprudence are settled '4 , and establish 
that that the conduct of a non-state actor may, in certain circumstances, 
constitute 'state action' and, therefore, be subject to constitutional rights. 
For example, private conduct may constitute state action where it is 
regulated directly by government, In Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co, the 
Supreme Court held that 'a sufficiently close nexus between the State and 
the challenged action of the required entity' must be established for the 
action of the latter to be treated as that of the state itself. 
Secondly, a private decision will amount to state action if exercised 
under the coercive power of the state or where the latter has provided 
such si~nificant encoura~ement, either overtly or covertly, that the choice 
could, in law, be deemed to be that of the state,'6 The case of Peterson v 
City oj Greenville, S.c. exemplifies the application of this rule, In this case, 
the appellants were black boys and girls who had been convicted of 
trespass for sitting at a store lunch counter. The evidence in this case 
established that the only reason for excluding the appellants from the 
restaurant was their race, The Supreme Court held that since an ordinance 
passed by a city authority, a state agent, required restaurant facilities to 
be operated on a segregated basis, the deCision of the owner of a private 
restaurant in deciding to exclude the defendants did precisely what the 
city law required and, therefore, that decision amounted to state action. 
Thirdly, acts performed by a non-state actor with the participation or 
involvement of the state 'through any arrangement, management, funds 
or property' may also constitute state action. s In Burton v Wilmington 
Parking Authority,''! an injunction was granted, restraining the operator of 
a restaurant located within a state-owned parking building from refusing to 
serve the appellant solely because he was black. Although the restaurant 
was privately owned, the Supreme Court found that a peculiar relationship 
1 I Ibid a( 318 
12109u.s.311(1883) 
13 See Schneider R 'The 1982 state action trilogy: Doctrinal contraction, confusion. and a 
proposal for change' (1985) 60 NOire Dame Law Review at I 150: Black CL 'Foreword: 
"State action", equal prolection and California's proposition' (1967) 81 Harvard Law Re-
view 69,95, 
14 See Strickland H 'The state aclion doctrine and the Rehnquist Court' (1991) 18 Hastings 
Constitlllional Law Quarterly 587, 645, 
15 415US,912,94S,CL 1407 U.S" 1974 
16 Blum v Paretsky 457 U.s. 991. 102 S.Cr. 2777, 73 LEd,2d 534. 
17373USZ44(1963) 
18 Coopf'r v Aaron 1958,358 U.s. 14, 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
existed between the restaurant and the parking authority, which meant. 
that the refusal was subject to the equality clause. Among other things, the 
government agency not only maintained the building, of which the restau-
rant was part, and benefited from the financial success of the restaurant, 
but the restaurant was also operated as an integral part of a public build-
ing devoted to a parking service. 
Fourthly, private conduct in which there is no apparent state involve-
ment may also constitute state action if it relates to functions or powers 
normally exercised by the government. In Marsh v Alabama, the Su-
preme Court held that the conduct of a corporation namely refusing the 
appellant permission to distribute religious literature in a town owned and 
run by the corporation was attributable to the state because the town 
did not function differently from any other town and its community 
shopping centre was freely accessible and open to the public. That refusal 
was found to be inconsistent with freedom of the press and freedom of 
religion. 
Lastly, it has also been held that a decision by the state to deny judicial 
or other intervention in enforcing raCially restrictive covenants constitutes 
state action. This rule was applied in the controversial decision of Shelley v 
Kraemer. 21 This case concerned the enforcement of an agreement signed 
between 39 owners of property in a specified residential area, which con-
tained a restrictive covenant excluding black persons from occupying any 
property in that residential area as owners or tenants. 22 The respondents. 
who were parties to this agreement and owners of some property in this 
residential area. brought a suit asking for an order restraining the petition-
ers, who were black people and had bought property in this residential 
area without knowledge of the restrictions. from taking possession of the 
property. At issue in the Supreme Court was whether the right to equality 
under the Fourteenth Amendment bound state courts to refuse to enforce 
restrictive covenants based on race or colour. The Court stated that re-
strictive agreements such as the ones in question. on their own. could not 
be regarded as a violation of any rights, as long as the purposes of the 
agreements were effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms. How-
ever, the same was not true, the court held. in respect of similar agree-
ments whose purposes were secured by judicial enforcement by state 
courts. Thus, it held that in granting judicial enforcement of restrictive 
agreements. the state denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws. 
These decisions demonstrate that despite the strong adherence to the 
traditional conception of rights as injunctions against the state, American 
Courts recognise that private conduct may be subject to constitutional 
rights in cenain limited circumstances. The manner in which constitu-
tional rights reach private conduct is indirect because it is the state that is 
held responSible. 
20 326 U.S. 501. 
21 Fn 6 above. 










































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
The rules of attribution of conduct to the state under the state action 
doctrine bear a close resemblance to those under the doctrine of state 
responsibility in international law." The latter is an age-old principle, which 
posits that a state is responsible for an international wrong committed 
against another state. In order for a state to be held responsible for an 
international wrong, the applicant must prove that the wrong complained 
of constitutes 'an act of the state,.24 However, the rules of state respons-
ibility in international law have received a more generous interpretation in 
human rights law, through the recognition of the duty to protect individ-
uals or groups from violations of their rights committed by non-state 
actors or other states. 25 International human rights law posits that a state 
will be responsible for violations committed in the private sphere if it 
failed to exercise due diligence to prevent those violations, investigate 
them, control or re~ulate private actors, or provide remedies when the 
violations occurred. 6 Failure by the state to comply with these duties 
would lead to a finding of state responsibility for the violation committed 
by private actors. Under this framework, the scope for finding state re-
sponsibility for acts of private actors is broader than that under the tradi-
tional notion of state responsibility in international law. 
It must be noted that the duty to protect constitutional rights is not rec-
ognised in American constitutional law. According to Henry Strickland, 
'[t]he state generally has no constitutional obligation to intervene in 
private disputes either to protect individuals from harm inflicted by other 
private entities or to force the wrongful private entities to compensate the 
victims of their wrongdoing,.27 While Shelley v Kraemer represents the 
closest that American courts have come to recognising the duty to protect, 
the case has been roundly criticised by those who consider constitutional 
rights to be of no relevance to private relations and has hardly been 
invoked again." 
The reluctance to recognise the duty to protect in American constitu-
tional law has limited the extent to which constitutional rights may reach 
private conduct indirectly. Erwin Chemerinsky has argued for the aboli-
tion of the state action doctrine because of its limited applicability to the 
23 Attempts to codify these rules have resulted in the adoption, by the International Law 
Commission, of the Draft Articles on ResponSibility of States for Internationally wrong-
ful Acts (Draft Articles), as contained in the Report of the International Law Commission 
on the Work of its 53'" Session, UN Doc A/55/1 0 (2000). Discussed in Crawford J The In-
ternational Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, text and com-
mentary (2002). 
24 Article 2 of the Draft Articles. 
25 Chirwa 0 'The doctrine of state responsibility as a potential means of making private 
actors accountable for human rights' (2004) 5 Melbourne journal oj International Law 1. 
26 This duty is explained in Velasquez Rodnguez v Honduras [1988] Inter-Am Court HR 
(ser C) No 4. 
27 Strickland (fn 14 above) at 608, See also DeShaney v Winnebago County Department oj 
Social Services (fn 6 above) 
28 Cole KL 'Federal and state "Slate action": The undercritical embrace of a hypercriticized 
doctrine' (1990) 24 Georgia Law Review 327. For counter-arguments, see Chemerinsky 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
conduct of non-state actors. Abolishing the doctrine means that 'the 
Constitution would be viewed as a code of social morals, not just of gov-
ernmental conduct, bestowing individual rights that no entity, public or 
private, could infringe without a compelling justification."o Stephen Gard-
baum has argued differently. but to the same effect, that the state action 
doctrine gives only a partial answer to the foundational question of the 
reach of constitutional rights into the private sphere in the United States. 
He submits that the supremacy clause in the American Constitution 
should be interpreted to mean that '[aJII law, including common law and 
the law at issue in litigation between private individuals is directly and 
fully subject to the Constitution'." 
In conclusion, the American Constitution is limited as regards the appli-
cation of its rights to private relations. Constitutional rights have no direct 
application to non-state actors. Rather, they can bind a non-state actor 
indirectly only where its conduct can be attributed to a state. The rules of 
attribution of state conduct are very limited, meaning that indirect appli-
cation of constitutional rights to private relations is also circumscribed. 
Furthermore, the American constitutional jurisprudence does not give full 
recognition to the state's duty to protect constitutional rights, which has 
also limited the extent to which non-state actors may be held indirectly 
accountable for human rights through the state. What is important to note 
is that this jurisprudence establishes that the conduct of private actors 
can, in limited cases, be constrained by constitutional rights. 
3 CANADA 
Like the American Constitution, the Charter does not contain an express 
provision regarding its application in the private sphere. However, sec-
tion 32( I) of the Chaner provides: 
This Charter applies 
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters 
within the authority of Parliament, including all matters relating to 
the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and 
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all 
matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. 
In Dolphin Delivery,32 the Canadian Supreme Court took a restrictive inter-
pretation of this section to hold that Charter rights do not bind private 
persons. The respondent in this case (Dolphin Delivery Company) was a 
private company engaged in a courier business. The appellants (a trade 
union and some of its members) advised the respondent that its place of 
business would be picketed unless it agreed to stop doing business with 
Supercourier, with whom the appellants were involved in an unresolved 
29 Chernerinsky ibid at 550 
30 Ibid. 
31 Gardbaum S 'The "horizontal effect" of constitutional rights' (2003) 102 Michigan Law 
Review 387. 389·· 390 










































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
labour dispute. Thereupon, the respondent made an application for an 
injunction to restrain the threatened picketing, which was granted. The 
basis of granting the injunction was that the threatened secondary picket-
ing amounted to the common law tort of inducing a breach of contract. 
The appellants' appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. 
In the appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue for consideration was 
whether secondary picketing by members of a trade union in a labour 
dispute is a protected activity under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter, 
which guarantees freedom of expression, and, therefore, not the proper 
subject of an injunction to restrain it. The Supreme Court found it easy to 
hold that the picketing sought to be restrained involved freedom of ex-
pression. However, since the parties to this matter were private, the 
question arose as to whether Charter rights had application to private 
litigation and common law. According to Mcintyre J, who wrote the opin-
ion of the court, section 32( 1) of the Charter was conclusive as regards the 
actors to whom the Charter is applicable. It was held that the actors 
bound by the Charter were the legislature, executive and administrative 
branches of government. With respect to these, the Charter will apply 
'whether or not their action is invoked in public or private litigation.'" As 
the respondent was a private company, the appellants could not plead 
freedom of expression as a defence to the injunction. 
Having denied the possibility of direct horizontal application of the 
Charter, the Supreme Court considered the question whether the Charter 
applied indirectly to private litigation through the Charter'S application to 
the judiciary and to common law. The Court rejected the contention, on 
grounds departing from the approach of the US courts in Shelley v 
Kraemer (discussed above), that judicial orders constitute governmental 
action. Mcintyre J refused to 
'equate for purposes of Charter application the order of a court with an element 
of governmental action. This is not to say that the courts are not bound by the 
Charter. The Courts are, of course, bound by the Charter as they are bound by 
all law. It is their duty to apply the law, but in doing so they act as neutral arbi-
ters, not as contending parties involved in a dispute. To regard the court order 
as an element of governmental intervention necessary to invoke the Charter 
WOUld, it seems to me, widen the scope of Charter application to virtually all 
private litigation ... A more direct and a more precisely defined connection 
between the element of government action and the claim advanced must be 
present before the Charter applies'. J4 
This dictum means that as far as litigation involves private actors, the 
judiciary is not bound to apply or consider the human rights provisions in 
the Charter, unless it can be shown that there is some governmental 
connection to the litigation at hand. The prime basis for this holding was 
that section 32( [) of the Charter did not mention the judiciary as an actor 
to whom it applied. 
33 Ibid par 41 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &, DEVELOPMENT 
Regarding the question whether the Charter applies to the common law. 
the Supreme Court held that this was possible 'only insofar as the com-
mon law is the basis of some governmental action which. it is alleged. 
infringes a guaranreed right or freedom,]5 Accordingly. 'where private 
party "A" sues private party "B" relying on the common law and where no 
act of qovernment is relied upon to support the action, the Charter will not 
apply'. 6 
The rationale for restricting the application of the Charter to the com-
mon law in this manner defies logic. The Court held in this case that the 
Chaner applies [0 all legislation, meaning that the Charter will apply to 
private relations when legislation is involved. It is difficult to understand 
why legislation should be subject [0 the Chaner in private litigation but 
not the common law. The implication of the Court's decision, which ( 
submit is absurd, is that it is governmental action when the legislature 
enacts law or a minister promulgates by-laws. but it is not state action 
when the judiciary 'makes'. develops or interprets the common law. What 
is more, the distinction between legislation and the common law, as 
regards the application of the Charter to private litigation, raises many 
questions which undermine the validity of the Court's rationale. As Brian 
Slattery has rightly asked: 
Where a statute partially modifies the common law governing a particular sub-
ject, silently leaving Other parts intact, is it sensible to hold that statutory por-
tions of the resulting legal regime are governed by the Charter while the 
common law portions are exempt? By the same token, where a statute merely 
replicates a portion of the common law rules governing a subject, making no 
mention of the remaining ponion, should we hold that the replicated rules are 
subject to Charter scrutiny while the others are not?37 
These questions underline the difficulties involved in separating legislation 
from the common law for purposes of application of human rights. The 
Court's rationale in this regard was weakened further by its concession 
that the Charter values were relevant to private litigation concerning the 
application of the common law. 38 It held that the judiciary, while not 
bound by the Charter in private litigation, 'ought to apply and develop the 
principles of the common law in a manner consistenr with the funda-
mental values enshrined in the Constitution'. The Coun did not provide 
any constitutional basis for holding so. given that it had rejected the 
argument that the Charter applied to private common law disputes:" 
35 Ibid par 41 
36 Ibid par 46. 
37 Slattery B 'The Charter'S relevance to private litigation: Does Dolphin deliver?' (1987) 32 
McGill Law Journal 905, 919 (emphasis original). 
38 Dolphin Delivery (fn 5 above) par 46. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Thus, Amnon Reichman has even suggested that '[t]he duty to develop the common 
law in light of constitutional values, therefore, is nOl derived from the supremacy of the 
Chaner, but from the cornman law itself'. See Reichman A 'A Charter-free domain: In 
defence of Dolphin Delivery' (2002) 35 The University of British Columbia Law Review 
329, 343. Apart from the fact that the decision in Dolphin does not suppOrt (his con-
struction, the view that common law inherenrly requires Courts to develop this law in 










































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
While the importance of Charter values to private law remains to be 
elaborated by Canadian courts,41 it appears that there is no significant 
difference, in effect, between the Charter rights applying directly to the 
common law or indirectly as Charter values. According to Peter Hogg, 
ltjhe rule that the common law should be developed in conformity with 'Char-
ter values' means that, although the Charter does not apply directly to the 
common law, it does apply indirectly. Despite some differences in the way s. I 
justification is assessed, the indirect application is much the same in effect as 
the direct application." 
It can therefore be said that constitutional rights have indirect application 
to private relations in Canada in the sense that they can be considered as 
values that can inform the development of the common law. They can 
also be relied upon in private litigation where either party invokes a 
provision in legislation that is inconsistent with any of those rights. Sig-
nificantly, unlike under the state action doctrine, it is the private party that 
is sued and held responsible for the conduct in issue, meaning that, 
although the manner in which constitutional rights are considered is said 
to be indirect, in effect, the private party is held directly responsible for 
the human rights violation. 
Litigants also have the option of suing the state in respect of violations 
of human rights committed in the private sphere. Until recently, Canadian 
constitutional law maintained that the rights entrenched in the Charter 
create only negative obligations." In Vriend v Alberta," the appellant was 
dismissed from his employment based on his sexual orientation
45 
He then 
made an application for a declaration that the exclusion of sexual orienta-
tion as a prohibited ground of discrimination from the Individual's Rights 
Protection Act'b amounted to a violation of the Charter, which recognises 
in section 15 the right to equality before and under the law and the right 
to equal protection and benefit of the law. The Supreme Court held that 
this omission constituted government action to which the Charter was 
applicable. The Court stated that, where the challenge concerns an Act of 
the legislature that is 'underinclusive' (or fails to protect Charter rights) as 
a result of an omission, section 32 should not be interpreted as precluding 
the application of the Charter. 47 The fact that the effect of applying the 
Charter to the impugned Act was to regulate private activity did not 
persuade the Court to hold otherwise. It was held that the Individual 
Rights Protection Act violated article I 5( I) of the Charter by failing to 
include "sexual orientation' as a ground of discrimination. 
line wirt! reason-based principles is nor only novel bur also an inviralion ro warer down 
rhe supremacy of constitutional values and rights. 
41 Weinrib L & Weinrib E 'Consritutional values and private law in Canada' in Friedmann 
& Barak-Erez (fn 7 above) 43, 46. 
42 Hogg P Constitlllionallaw oj Canada 2 (2001) 34 - 24 (footnotes omitted). 
43 See Macklem T 'Vriend v. Alberta: Making the private public' (1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 
197,209. 
44 156D.LR. (4th) 385, [1998] I S.C.R.493. 
45 Ibid par 7. 
46 1972 (Alta.) 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
Another case, Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney GeneraO:a concerned the 
exclusion of agricultural workers from Ontario's statutory labour relations 
regime, The appellants, who were individual farm workers and union 
organisers, argued that this exclusion amounted to an infringement of 
their Freedom of association under the Charter as they were prevented 
from establishing, joining and participating in the lawful activities of a 
trade union:o They also claimed that the labour legislation violated their 
equality rights under section I I) of the Chaner by denying them the 
statutory protection enjoyed by most occupational groups in Ontario, In 
finding [hat these rights were violated, the Supreme Court of Canada 
stated, while reiterating that Charter rights do nor generally create positive 
obligations on the state, that 'the Charter may oblige the state to extend 
underinclusive statutes to the extent that underinclusion licenses private 
actors to violate basic rights and freedoms.so According to the Court, this 
may be so to the extent that underinclusive state action 'substantially 
orchestrates, encourages or sustains the violation of fundamental free-
doms' ," Thus, the impugned legislation was found to be unconstitutional. 
These cases establish that failure by the state to take legislative meas-
ures to prevent certain kinds of human rights violations committed by 
private actors will lead to state responSibility, The precise scope of the 
duty to protect is yet to be developed by Canadian Courts, but it can be 
envisaged that a more expansive deFinition of this duty, as developed in 
international human rights law, will be adopted, 
Thus, it can be concluded that, apart from enforcing the obligations of 
non-state actors by suing the state, the courts in Canada have conceded, 
albeit in a limited way, that constitutional rights also have relevance to 
private litigation, Where the litigation involves legislation, Charter rights 
will have direct application, By contrast, Charter rights will be considered 
as Charter values where the issues raised in the private litigation concerns 
common law, 
4 GERMANY AND THE DOCTRINE OF DRlITWIRKUNG 
Like the American Constitution and the Canadian Charter, the German 
Constitution 52 does not contain an explicit provision concerning the direct 
application of 'basic rights' to non-state actors. 53 However, article 1 (3) of 
the German Constitution provides expressly that 'basic rights shall bind the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiCiary as directly applicable law','4 
The absence of an express provision led to the emergence of two main 
schools of thought, one school represented mainly by Hans Nipperdey 
48 [2001J 3S,C.R. 1016. 
49 Ibid par I, 
50 Ibid par 26. 
51 Ibid, 
52 Basic Law for the Republic of Germany {Grundgesetz. GGl promulgated all 23 May 1949. 
53 Markesinis B 'Privacy, freedom of expression, and the horizontal effect of the Human 
Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany' (1999) I 15 Law Quarterly Review 47, 49, 










































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
and Walter Leisner who argued that basic rights had direct horizontal 
application, but no indirect application, and the other represented primar-
ily by Gunter Durig propounding the opposite view." 
Early decisions, rendered by the Federal Labour Court, in which 
Hans Nipperdey presided, took the view that basic rights bound private 
actors directly.s6 This meant that basic rights could be invoked as the basis 
of an action or defence to an action in litigation involving non-state 
actors. 
However, the Federal Constitutional Court appears to have disregarded 
these decisions. Its jurisprudence establishes that basic rights apply to all 
law, including private law. Thus, while a private person may not bring a 
direct constitutional action against another, parties to private litigation 
may raise basic rights in support of their respective positions through the 
general clauses and concepts of private law. 
The Luth Case (1958)57 is regarded as a 'linchpin of German constitu-
tional Jaw', 58 especially on the issue of the horizontal effect of basic rights. 
Erich Luth was the Director of Information and an active member of a 
group whose objective was to contribute to achieving reconciliation be-
tween Jews and Christians in the aftermath of the Nazi regime. When a 
film director, Veit Harlan, well-known for producing anti-Semitic films 
during the Nazi regime, produced a new movie in 1950 after his acquittal 
of Nazi crimes, Luth called for a public boycott of the film arguing that the 
re-emergence of this film director could jeopardise reconciliation efforts. 
Consequently, the film's producer and distributor applied for an injunction 
to restrain Luth from urging the German public not to see the movie and 
asking theatre owners and distributors not to show or distribute the film. 
The injunction was granted by the lower court on the ground that Luth's 
actions amounted to actionable incitement under article 826 of the Ger-
man Civil Code. An appeal by Luth to the Court of Appeals was rejected. 
As a result, he filed a constitutional complaint in the Federal Constitutional 
Court, alleging that the superior court had violated his right to free speech 
enshrined under article 5( 1) of the Constitution. 
The Federal Constitutional Court, while endorsing the idea that 'the 
primary purpose of basic rights is to safeguard the liberties of the individ-
ual against interferences by public authority'," stated that: 
55 See generally Lewan K 'The significance of constitutional rights for private law: Theory 
and practice in West Germany' (1968) 17 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
571. 
56 See Oeter S 'Fundamental rights and their impact on private law - Doctrine and 
practice under the German Constitution' (1994) 12 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 7. 
11. 
57 7 BVerfGE 198. The facts and holding as discussed herein are based on the English 
translation of the case in Komrners DP The constitutional jurisprudence oj the Federal Re-
public oj Germany 2ed (1997) 361 - 368. All page references of the judgernent are cited 
to this book. 
58 Kornrners ibid 361. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
[ilt is equally true, however, that the Basic Law is not a value-neutral docu-
ment .. Its section on basic rights establishes an objective order of values, and 
this order strongly reinforces the effective power of basic rights ... Thus it is 
clear that basic rights also influence [the development of] private law. Every 
provision of private law must be compatible with this system of values, and 
every such provision must be interpreted in its spirit."o 
Thus, basic rights serve the function of 'influencing' the development of 
private law in Germany and, as such, bind private actors indirectly. This 
influence, the Court suggested, would be through those provisions of 
private law that contain mandatory rules of law Forming part of the ordre 
public."i These are rules which 'for reasons of the general welfare also are 
binding on private legal relationships and are removed from the dominion 
of private intent' .62 This influence could also occur through the interpreta-
tion of general clauses in private law, such as 'good morals' .6' 
The duty to consider basic rights when applying and interpreting sub-
stantive rules of private law, it was held, emanates from article 1 (3) of the 
Constitution cited above, which states that basic rights shall bind, among 
other actors, 'the judiciary'. Thus, if a judge fails to apply these standards 
and ignores the influence of constitutional law on the rules of private law, 
he/she violates 'objective constitutionallaw'.M 
Applying these principles to the main issue in the present case, the 
Court held that Luth was acting within his rights to state his views about 
the film in public, given his especially close relation to all that concerned 
the German-Jewish relationship. It regarded as unjustified the contention 
that, under these circumstances, Luth should nevertheless have refrained 
from expressing his opinion out of regard for the director's proFessional 
interest and the economic interests of the film companies employing him. 
It stated that 'where the formation of public opinion on a matter impor-
tant to the general welfare is concerned, private and especially individual 
interests must. in principle, yield'. Thus, it was concluded that the supe-
rior court violated the complainant'S right enshrined in article 5( I) by 
misjudging the special significance of the basic right to freedom of opinion 
in assessing the behaviour of the complainant. The decision of the supe-
rior court uphOlding the injunction was thus quashed. 
While the Llith Case engaged in a balancing exercise of a constitutional 
basic right and a right protected by private law, the Mephisto Case (1971 
considered two conflicting constitutional rights. In the 1930s Klaus Man 
published a novel based on the character of his brother-in-law, Gustaf 
Grundgens, an actor who had gained prominence by subscribing to and 




64 Ibid 364. 
65 Ibid 367. 
66 30 BVerfGE 173. The discussion of this case is based on the English translation of the 
case in Kommer::; (fn 57 above) at 301 - 304 & 427 - 430. Page references below are 










































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
supporting the Nazi ideology and regime. An adopted son of Grundgens 
applied for an injunction, which was granted. banning the distribution of 
the novel. on the ground that it 'dishonoured the good name and memory 
of the now-deceased actor,.6B Consequently, the publisher of the novel 
filed a conslitulional complaint in the Federal Constitutional Court arguing 
that the lower courts violated the right to freedom of art and science 
guaranteed in article 5(3) of the Constitution. 
The Court held that article 5 of the Constitution guarantees autonomy of 
the arts without reservation.
CQ 
However, it went on to hold that the lower 
courts properly conSidered the late actor's right to human dignity as a 
limitation on freedom of the arts. It reasoned thus: 
It would be inconsistent with the constitutionally guaranteed right of the invio-
lability of human dignity. which forms the basis for all basic rights, if a per-
son .. could be degraded or debased even after his death. Accordingly the 
obligation which article I (I) imposes on all state authority to protect the indi-
vidual against attacks on his dignity does not end with death
70 
After weighing the two rights and considering the circumstances of the 
case, the decision was made, in favour of Grundgens, to protect the 
dignity of the now deceased actor. In other words, the decisions of the 
lower courts restraining the distribution of the novel were affirmed. 
The above discussion demonstrates that basic rights have 'strong' indi-
rect horizontal application, It is indirect simply because a private person 
may not commence a constitutional action against another private per-
son. One has to rely on private law to redress violations of human rights. 
In addition, the cases brought before the Federal Constitutional Court are 
argued as if a lower court had violated the right in issue, rather than the 
private action involved in the litigation. What is interesting. however, is 
that, despite these technical points, the Federal Constitutional Court has 
held quiw clearly that private law courts have the duty to consider human 
rights if called upon by the parties [Q the case at hand. If they fail to do so, 
67 Kornmers (fn 57 above) 301. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid at 428. 
70 Ibid. 
7 I This case and the jurisprudence it has generated were given a renewed impetus by two 
recent decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court in 200 I, The first, handed down in 
February. concerned the validity of a marital agreernent whereby a mother waived 
claims relating to the maintenance of her son and herself in the event of a divorce, It 
was held that the agreement constituted a violation of the right to family protection and 
the rights of the child. The other decision handed down in March in rhe same year also 
concerned (he validity or a marital agreement, The Court reiterated that it has an Obliga-
tion to 'exercise control of the agreement's content and, where necessary, correct [he 
contractual terms in order to render the agreement compatible with the Constitution'. It 
considered the woman's inferior bargaining position, quashed the decision of the lower 
court and ordered the former husband to pay a stipulated monthly sum as maintenance 
for the ex-wife. Both cases are discussed by an anonymous aurtlOr in 'Constitutional 
control of marital agreements II: The FCC affirms its path-breaking decision' (2001) 2 
German Law Journal. online journal available at http://www.grmanlawjournal.comi 










































LAW. DEMOCMCY & DEVELOPMENT 
the aggrieved party may commence a constitutional complaint before the 
Federal Constitutional Court. 
Compared with the position in the United States and Canada, basic 
rights have a wider reach in Germany. There is no need to prove state 
action before invoking basic rights. All laws have to be construed and 
interpreted against the backdrop of basic rights. Furthermore, German 
courts, unlike those in the US and Canada. are bound to consider basic 
rights when resolving purely private disputes. While it could be said that 
section I (3) of the German Constitution, which expressly provides that the 
judiciary is bound by basic rights. is responsible for the manner in which 
courts have understood the influence of basic rights on private law. it 
must also be noted that the decisions discussed above essentially also 
recognise that German Courts are bound to protect peoples' rights. This is 
why the failure by a lower court to consider human rights when resolving 
private disputes is considered by the Federal Constitutional Court as a 
violation by the lower court of the human rights involved. As a result, the 
impact of basic rights on private law and, by extension, on private con-
duct has been more significant than has been the case with constitutional 
rights on the US or Canadian private law. 
5 IRELAND 
Like the constitutions of the United States, Canada and Germany, the Irish 
Constitutionn does not have an express provision recognising the applica-
tion of constitutional rights to non-state actors. Article 40(3) of this Consti-
tution provides: 
I. The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, 
by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. 
2. The State shall. in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from 
unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, per-
son. good name, and property rights of every citizen. 
This article clearly imposes on the state the duty to respect and protect 
the rights of citizens. The duty to protect is defined in a manner that 
suggests that the state would discharge its duty by simply enacting legisla-
tion aimed at defending and vindicating the personal rights of the citizen. 
However. the Supreme Court of Ireland has construed these provisions 
quite broadly. The case of Meskell v C.1.t.,73 is often credited as authority 
for the contention that human rights under the Irish Constitution bind 
non-state actors such that an action against a private person alleging an 
infringement of a right could be based on the Constitution. In that case. 
Walsh J stated that: 
[a] right guaranteed by the Constitution or granted by the Constitution can be 
protected by action or enforced by action even though such action may not fit 
72 Adopted on I st July 1937. entered into force 011 December 1937, as amended up to 7 
November 2002. 
73 [1973J I I.R. 121. It was held in this case tllat to try to alter the constitutional rights of 
an employee retrospectively by enforcing a closed shop agreement on current employ-










































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
into any of the ordinary forms of action in either common law or equity and 
that the constitutional right carries with it its own right to a remedy or for the 
enforcement of it." 
In fact, the view that non-state actors have duties in relation to human 
rights was recognised far earlier than this case. In Educational Company of 
Ireland Ltd v Fitzpatrick (No. 2),75 Budd J held thus: 
If an established right in law exists a citizen has the right to assert it and it is 
the duty of the Courts to aid and assist him in the assertion of his right. The 
Court will therefore assist and uphold a citizen's constitutional rights. Obedi-
ence to the law is required of every citizen, and it follows that if one citizen has 
a right under the Constitution there exists a correlative duty on the part of other 
citizens to respect that right and not to interfere with it. To say otherwise would 
be tantamount to saying that a citizen can set the Constitution at a naught and 
that a right solemnly given by our fundamental law is valueless 76 
This dictum clearly demonstrates that Irish courts regard rights as enti-
tlements requiring protection from both the state and other actors. In 
Attorney General (Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (Ireland) Ltd) 
v Open-Door Counselling Ltd,'7 Hamilton J, of the Irish High Court, also 
stated that 'the judicial organ of government is obliged to lend its support 
to the enforcement of the right to life of the unborn, to defend and vindi-
cate that right and, if there is a threat to that right from whatever source, to 
protect that right from such threat, if its support is sought' 78 In this case, 
the defendants, both private companies, provided services to pregnant 
women, such as counselling those who had an unwanted pregnancy and 
those who sought assistance on the options open to them. The plaintiff 
sought a declaration that the activities of the defendants infringed the 
right of the unborn to life and an injunction to stop those activities." Both 
the High Court and the Supreme Court found that the activities of the 
defendants, in counselling or assisting pregnant women to obtain further 
advice on abortion or obtain an abortion abroad, violated the right of the 
unborn to life guaranteed under article 40(3)(3) of the Constitution. Finlay 
CJ, who wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court, stated that both the 
legislature and the judiciary had a duty to defend and vindicate the right 
to life of the unborn. 
This case can be criticised on the ground that it did not consider the 
question of abortion against the backdrop of women's reproductive rights 
and the right to security of the person. However, it is cited here as an 
authority for the position that Irish courts consider constitutional rights 
binding on non-state actors. 
Another case in which a violation of a constitutional right by non-state 
actors was found, concerned a socio-economic right. In Crowley v Irish 
74 Ibid 134. 
75 [19611I.R. 345. 
76 Ibid 368 (emphasis added) 
77 [1988J I.R. 593. 
78 Ibid 599 (emphasis added). 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
National Teachers Organisation:o the defendants were a teachers' organi-
sation, its members and a number of national teachers. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants had violated their right to education by reason 
of the defendants' circular written in August 1976, as part of a strike, to 
neighbouring schools urging the latter not to accept pupils from Dri-
moleague national school. As a result, the pupils of that school were 
deprived of schooling until February 1977. It was held that the actions of 
the teachers were both unjustified and illegal, and constituted an unlawful 
interference with the plaintiff's constitutional right to education. 
As is clear from these cases, Irish courts consider themselves bound to 
allow constitutional claims alleging violations of human rights, as part of 
the fulfilment of the duty to prO£ect entrenched in article 40(3) of the 
Constitution. As has been argued earlier, where the Constitution does not 
expressly state that the judiciary is bound by rights, the recognition of this 
duty alone supports the interpretation given by Irish Courts of the role of 
human rights in the private sphere. 
A fear has been expressed that the explicit recognition of direct hori-
zontal application of human rights would see common law actions being 
replaced by 'innominate claims for infringements of personal rights'.S! 
Contrary to this expectation, Gerard Hogan and Gerry White observe that 
nothing of this son has happened in Ireland.82 They write that, rather, 
courts have 'taken the view that it is only in those cases where common 
law remedies are inadequate or non-existent that an action based directly 
on the Constitution would arise,83 In Hanrahan v Merck Sharp & Dohme 
(Ireland) Ltd84 Henchy J stated that 
[s]o far as I am aware, the constitutional provisions relied on have never been 
used in the courts to shape the form of any existing tort or to change the nor-
mal onus of proof. The implementation of those constitutional rights is primar-
ily a matter for the State and the courts are entitled to intervene only when 
there has been a failure to implement or, where the implementation relied on is 
plainly inadequate, to effectuate the constitutional guarantee in question. In 
many torts for example, negligence, defamation, trespass to a person or 
property a plaintiff may give evidence of what he claims to be a breach of a 
constitutional right, but he may fail in the action because of what is usually a 
matter of onus of proof or because of some other legal or technical defence. A 
person may of course, in the absence of a common law or statutory cause of 
action, sue directly for breach of a constitutional right (see Meskell v C,IE 
IR 121); but when he founds his action on an existing tort he is normally confined 
to the limitations of that tort. It might be different if it could be shown that the 
tort in question is basically ineffective to protect his constitutional rights
85 
It was held in this case that the right to bodily integrity and the right to 
property did not have the effect of shifting the onus of prooF from the 
80 [19801 LR. 102. 
81 Hogan G &. While G The Irish Constitution (fM Kerry) (1994) 707 (ci[ing Heuston R 
'Personal rights under the Irish Constitution' (1976) II Irish jurist 205). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 











































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
plaintiff to the defendant in an action for nuisance. The plaintiffs had the 
burden to show that their person or property had suffered injury or dam-
age, but also that the emissions from the defendant's factory were the 
cause of the injury or damage:" 
As is clear from this case, where common law or statutory law is inade-
quate to redress a human rights infringement, the victim may bring a 
direct constitutional tort action. In some cases, the courts may develop 
the common law in line with the Constitution. In McKinley v The Minister 
of Defence,S? for example, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the 
right to bring an action for loss of consortium and servitium was inconsis-
tent with the right to equality, as it was available to the husband only, not 
the wife. In order to cure the inconsistency, the majority of the Supreme 
Court held that this action would continue to exist, but that wives would 
also have the right to sue for loss of consortium. 
The foregOing discussion demonstrates that the Irish Constitution ad-
mits of full horizontal effect of the constitutional rights. This position has 
not resulted from an express provision of the Constitution recognising the 
application of the Bill of Rights to private actors. Rather, Irish courts have 
interpreted article 40(3), which essentially embodies the duty to protect, 
as the basis of this pOSition. Thus, claims alleging violations of human 
rights based directly on the Constitution can be permitted. Significantly, 
Irish courts have also recognised that private law contains causes of action 
which give effect to human rights However, they have not required that 
all human rights violations should be addressed through private law 
actions. Where private law (statutory or common law) is inadequate, 
ineffective or not available [0 redress a human rights infringement in the 
private sphere, the victim has the option of commencing a direct constitu-
tional claim:" Where reliance is placed on a common law action, the court 
may develop that law in line with the right in question.
s9 
6 SOUTH AFRICA 
Unlike all the other constitutions discussed in this article, the South AFri-
can Constitution adopted in 1996 expressly recognises that non-state actors 
are bound by constitutional rights. Secrion 8 provides: 
(I) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, 
and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature 
of the right and the nature of any dUly imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic 
person in terms of subsection (2)' a court -
86 {bid. 
87 [1992] I.R. 333. 
88 Hanrahan v Merck Sharp &. Dohme ([re/and) Ltd (fn 84 above) 146. 










































LAW. DeMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
(a) in order to give effect 1O a right in the Bill. must apply, or if neces-
sary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does 
not give effect [0 that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided 
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36( I). 
It must be noted that subsection I explicitly states that the Bill of Rights 
applies 1O 'all law' and also binds the 'judiciary' Section 7( I) of the In-
terim Constitution was drafted without these important terms. All it 
provided for was that '[the Bill of Rights] [bound] all legislative and execu-
tive organs of state at all levels of government' although it also stated in 
section 35(1) that '[i]n the interpretation of any law and the application 
and development of the common law and cuslOmary law, a court [was 
bound toj have regard to the spirit, purport and objects of [the Bill of 
Rights)'. 
These provisions were given a narrow interpretation in Du Plessis and 
Others v De Klerk and Another
qO 
by the South African Constitutional COUrt, 
following the Canadian decision in Dolphin Delivery discussed earlier. It 
held that constitutional rights under the Interim Constitution could be 
invoked against an organ of government but not by one private litigant 
against another91 But constitutional rights, it was held, were relevant 1O 
private litigation where a party alleged that a statute or executive act 
relied on br the other party was invalid for being inconsistent with any of 
the rights." Furthermore, the Court held that, since constitutional rights 
applied [0 the common law, governmental acts or omissions committed 
in reliance on the common law could be attacked by a private litigant as 
being inconsistent with those rights.
9
' The thrust of this decision was that 
the Bill of Rights was irrelevant [0 private litigation where no governmen-
tal conduct or legislation was relied upon by either party to the litigation. 
Section 8 of the final Constitution suggests a departure from this deCi-
sion, not only because it expressly states that the Bill of Rights applies to 
all law and binds the judiciary but also because it explicitly states that the 
Bill of Rights would bind a natural or legal person to the extent that it is 
applicable, depending on the right and nature of duties involved. 
While sections 8( 1) and (2) appear to be relatively straightforward, con-
troversy and confusion has arisen among South African academics as to 
whether the Bill of Rights has direct or indirect application to private 
disputes. This confusion is coloured by remnants of Dolphin Delivery 
thinking, although it can also be attributed to the manner in which sec-
tion 8 is drafted and the inclusion of section 39(2) of the Constitution. As 
noted above, section 8(3) of the Constitution states that When applying a 
provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or legal person, the court must 
apply or develop the common law to the extent that legislation does not 
give effect to the right. It may also develop the common law to limit the 
90 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (,Ou Plessis') 












































THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
right in accordance with the limitation clause in section 36( I} of the 
Constitution, Section 39(2) of the Constitution states that '[wlhen inter-
preting any legislation, and when developing the common law or custom-
ary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights', 
Cheadle and Davis have argued that these sections do not mean that 
constitutional rights apply directly to private conduct:4 They argue instead 
that human rights under the South African Constitution apply to non-state 
actors only indirectly through their application to law, 
A slightly different line of reasoning is advanced by Sprigman and Os-
borne, who argue that section 8 of the Constitution has not altered the 
position under the Interim Constitution as interpreted in Du Plessis. 95 They 
argue that this section simply mandates indirect application of the Bill of 
Rights. They understand indirect application as a method whereby a court 
faced with a private dispute will apply and develop the common law in a 
manner consistent with the values contained in the Bill of Rights, Indirect 
application is, importantly, different from direct application in that the 
result the court's decision - is not a constitutional ruling with the rigidity 
and finality attendant upon such a decision, but a common law ruling 
made in light of constitutional values; ie a ruling that is amenable to 
repeal or modification by ordinary legislation,"" 
Currie and De Waal have defined direct and indirect application simi-
larly,91 Like Sprigman and Osborne, they hold that direct application 
entitles the applicant to a constitutional remedy that 'overrides ordinary 
law' and 'any conduct' that is inconsistent with the right. By contrast, 
indirect application does not 'override ordinary law or generate its own 
remedies',' Rather, it demands that ordinary law must be interpreted in 
accordance with an 'objective normative value system' established by the 
Constitution. IOU 
However, unlike Sprigman and Osborne, who make very light of the 
specific language used in sections 8 and 39(2) of the Constitution. Currie 
and De Waal posit that the 1996 Constitution has moved away from the 
position in Du Plessis and now admits of both direct and indirect applica-
tion to private conduct and disputes. They hold that section 8 permits the 
direct application of constitutional rights to private disputes, while sec-
tion 39(2) entrenches indirect application. Curiously, however, Currie and 
De Waal come close to the position advanced by Sprigman and Osborne 
by argUing that 'indirect application was (and remains), in accordance 
94 Cheadle H &. Davis D 'StruclUre oj the Bill oj Rights' in Cheadle HM er al (eds) South 
AJrican constilUtionallaw: The Bill of Righ[s (2002) t. 3, 
95 Sprigrnan C and Osborne M 'Ou Plessis is nO( dead: South Africa's 1996 Constitution 
and the application of [he Bill of Rights to private disputes' (t 999) 15 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 25, 
96 lbid 36, 
97 Currie I &. De Waal J The Bill oj Rights Handbook (2005) 32, 64, 












































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
with the principle of avoidance. preferred to direct application' and that 
the latter will offer no meaningful advantages over indirect application 
when resolving private disputes, except in very limited instances where a 
common law rule is being challenged so that the courts can invalidate ie 'o, 
The effect of Currie and De Waal's argument is that sections 8(2) and (3) 
of the Constitution are only relevant when common law is inconsistent 
with a right and in need of reform or development. As I argue below, this 
is not mandated by a proper construction of the text in section 8(3). In 
terms of this section, courts need not always develop the common law in 
order to give effect to a constitutional right. 
While criticising Currie and De Waal for drawing a line between direct 
application under section 8 and indirect application under section 39(2) of 
the Constitution, Roederer posits that there is no difference in effect 
between the twO. '02 He adopts an analysis that gives more weight to the 
role of section 39(2) than section 8 of the Constitution in resolving private 
disputes concerning the Bill of Rights. In attempting to show that consid-
eration of human rights in private disputes will always involve a balancing 
of conflicting rights, he projects the significance of section 39(2) on such 
cases thus: 
It is only by looking at the spirit, and purport of the Bill of Rights that the 
balancing (mutually limiting) process can make constitutional sense. Not only is 
this dictated by the logic of viewing the Constitution as a coherent scheme of 
value, but is dictated by the Constitutional text itself. The s 36 analysis required 
of s 8(3) limitations asks whether the limitation is 'reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on equality, dignity and freedom'. These 
values are integral to the spirit, and purport of the Bill of Rights. 'o, 
Khumalo and Others v Holomisa
,04 
is the only case decided by the Constitu-
tional Court after Du Plessis that deals with the meaning of section 8 of 
the South African Constitution. In this case, the applicant entered an 
exception to the respondent'S claim for damages for defamation, arguing 
that the respondent'S particulars of claim did nor disclose a cause of 
action because it failed to aver that the alleged defamatory s£atement was 
actually false. The applicant argued that the right to freedom of expression 
under section 16 of the Constitution meant that a person claiming dam-
ages for defamation in respect of a published statement concerning a 
matter of public interest, political significance or the fitness of a public 
official for public office bore the burden of proving the falsity of the 
statement. 
The Constitutional Court (per O'Regan J) found that the right to freedom 
of expression was of direct horizontal application to this dispute in terms 
of section 8(2) of the Constitution. However, it held that the absence of a 
requirement within the common law of defamation for the plaintiff to 
prove the falsity of the alleged defamatory statement was a justifiable 
101 Ibid 50. 
102 Roederer C 'Pos[·malrix legal reasoning: Horizontality and the rule of values in South 
African law' (2003) 19 South Ajricanjourna[ on Human Rights 57. 
103 Ibid 76 - 77 (footnotes ornined). 
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limitation on this right in terms of section 8(3)(b) of the Constitution. This 
decision was reached by balancing the right to freedom of expression of 
the media and human dignity. The Court stated that while the applicants 
were right to argue that 'individuals can assert no strong constitutional 
interest in protecting their reputations against the publication of truthful 
but damaging statements', the applicants did not have a strong constitu-
tional interest in publishing false material. 105 It concluded that the defence 
of reasonableness of the publication, where the defendant cannot prove 
the truth of the defamatory statement, struck an appropriate balance 
between the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the respon-
dents' right to dignity because, according to the Court, this defence ade-
quately considers the difficulties and lessens the burden of establishing 
the truth by defendants to a defamation case. '06 
Although some commentators have argued that Khumalo is 'exception-
ally clear' ,'07 this case has not resolved all issues involved in the direct and 
indirect application debate. In particular. it fails to clarify the relationship 
between section 8 and section 39(2) of the Constitution, let alone the 
relationship between section 8( I) and 8(2)-(3) of the Constitution. In a 
rather confUSing fashion, O'Regan J held that common law would not be 
the subject of direct application of the Constitution where a dispute in-
volves private parties, arguing that to do so would render section 8(3) 
superfluous. loa It is not clear in the judgment what the difference really is 
when human rights are said to apply to the common law or any law 
directly or indirectly. Assuming that the judge uses the terms as defined 
by Currie and De Waal, I would be inclined to with Roederer, who 
has persuasively argued that the courts' powers under section 39(2) of the 
Constitution to develop the common law in accordance with the object 
and spirit of the Bill of Rights necessarily include the powers to declare the 
common law invalid. This renders the difference between direct and 
indirect application under sections 39(2) and 8(2)-(3) unimportant on this 
point. 
More importantly, Woolman has rightly pointed OUt in an incisive but 
long-winded critique of [he case that this decision resuscitates the Du 
Plessis and Dolphin Delivery reasoning. because O'Regan's decision has 
the effect of saying that any law or the common law can be challenged for 
being inconsistent with the Constitution in all circumstances where the 
parties at least include the state, but only in limited circumstances where 
the parties are private. 'oo This holding ignores the importance and neutrality 
105 Ibid par 43. 
106 This defence was developed in National Media Limited and Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 
1 196 (SCA). In Khllmalo (fn 104 above) par 43 O'Regan J detlned thiS defence thus: 'It 
permits a publisher who can establish the truth in the public benefit to do so and avoid 
liability. But if a publisher cannot establish the truth, or Finds it disproportionately ex-
pensive or difficult to do so, the publisher may show that in all the circumstances the 
putllication was reasonable'. 
107 See e.g. Roederer (fn 102 above) 62. 
108 Khllmalo (fn 104 above) par 32. 











































LAW, DEMOCRACY a DEVELOPMENT 
of sections 8( I) and 39(2) of the Constitution regarding the relevance of 
constitutional values to the development of the law and common law."
G 
These provisions cannot be said to be subject to development in accor-
dance with the spirit and objects of the Bill of Rights only when the parties 
before the Court include the State. 
However, Currie and De Waal have rightly construed Khumalo as stand-
ing for the position that, in any case where a specific right is implicated by 
a private dispute, recourse must, as far as possible, be had to section 8(3) 
rather than placing general reliance on section 8( I) or section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. III In this sense, Khumalo reaffirms the significance of sec-
tions 8(2) and (3), which expressly acknowledge that constitutional rights 
bind non-state actors depending on the nature of the right at hand and the 
duty it imposes. Once it is concluded that a given right binds a non-state 
actor, courts are enjoined in terms of section 8(3) of the Constitution to 
apply or develop common law to the extent that legislation does not give 
effect to that right or to limit it in accordance with the limitation clause. In 
essence, this section makes provision for avenues for enforcing obliga-
tions of non-state actors in relation to constitutional rights, or obtaining 
redress for violations of constitutional rights committed by non-state 
actors. While it forecloses the possibility of direct constitutional claims, it 
defers to the legislature to devise remedies for redressing violations of 
rights by natural or legal persons or enforcing their obligations. If legisla-
tion is absent or fails to give full effect to the right at hand, courts are 
enjoined to apply the common law and/or develop it to the extent that 
legislation fails to give effect to the right or to consider whether the com-
mon law constitutes a justifiable limitation on the right. 
Thus, sections 8(2) and (3) of the South African Constitution have very 
wide import. A common law action or legislation that adequately gives full 
effect to a given right may constitute an instance of the direct application 
of that right, even if the common law involved has not been developed or 
the legislation is not invalidated for being inconsistent with a right. Fur-
thermore, a court is empowered to go as far as fashioning a new remedy 
where legislation or the common law fails to make adequate provision for 
the right implicated in a private dispute. 
This position can be distinguished from that obtaining in Ireland where, 
as pointed out above, a litigant alleging a violation of a right by a non-
state actor can bring a direct constitutional claim where the relevant com-
mon law cause of action and remedy is ineffective or inadequate to give 
full effect to the right concerned. In South Africa, while legislation and 
common law are the principal avenues for addressing human rights 
concerns in the private sphere, courts have express powers to develop the 
t to See also Cheadle HM 'Application' in Cheadle HM et al (eds) Sowh African constitutional 
law: The Bill of Rights (2005) 3- t, 3 - t 3 arguing that '[a]lIlaw should now be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny irrespective of how and with whom it arises in litigation.' 
1 1 1 Fn 104 above 1 - 52. Woolman (fn 109 above) 31-83 has also interpreted Khumalo as 
meaning that courts should ·interpret legislation or develop the common law in light of 
the general objects of the Bill of Rights only where no specific right can be relied upon 










































THE HORIZONTAL APPUCATION Of CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
common law to give full effect to a right. By contrast, the Irish jurispru-
dence shows that couns do not have such powers. It therefore makes 
sense that direct constitutional claims against non-stale actors should be 
permitted in Ireland, but not in South Africa where any deficiencies in 
legislation and the common law can be rectified through the development 
of the common law. 
If Khumalo and sections 8(2) and (3) were understood as requiring 
courts to consider applying these provisions first before invoking sec-
tion 39(2), the argument by Currie and De Waal that indirect application 
under section 39(2) should be preferred to direct application ought to be 
revisited. Likewise, the contention advanced by Cheadle and Davis that 
the Bill of Rights does not have direct application to private conduct is also 
incorrect because, as we have seen above, the first decision to be made in 
terms of section 8(3) is whether the right at hand binds the non-state 
actor, before a common law action can be commenced to redress that 
right. Furthermore, by applying the common law, even without develop-
ing it, it may be sufficient to enforce a human right's obligation of a non-
state actor. 
It is also not entirely true that section 8(3) and 39(2) represent the same 
thing - indirect application of the Constitution (as argued by Sprigman 
and Osborne) or that they have the same effect (as argued by Roederer). 
Roederer has rightly observed that the two sections are intimately con-
nected,"2 but treating them as if they were the same is not correct in the 
South African Context. Section 39(2) embodies the German Drittwirkung 
concept, which stipulates that constitutional values must be considered 
when interpreting or developing the common law. This concept means 
that couns must interpret mandatory rules of law forming part of the 
ordre public or such general clauses in private law as 'good morals'. 13 
Entry points for interpreting the common law in a manner that gives 
effect to the general objects and spirit of the Bill of Rights are very limited. 
This is not the case with section 8(2) and (3), which in any case subsumes 
section 39(2). As seen above, section 8(3) makes reference to the develop-
ment of the common law, meaning that constitutional values can be con-
sidered even when applying this section. Khumalo offers an excellent ex-
ample where, in applying section 8(2) and (3). O'Regan J counterbalanced 
the right to freedom of expression and the values of transparency and 
open democracy against the constitutional values of human dignity, 
freedom and equality. Clearly. the South African Constitution has gone far 
beyond what has been achieved in Germany through the Drittwirkung 
concept and it is clearly wrong to reduce section 8(2) and (3) of the South 
African Constitution to this concept. 
Finally, it must also be pointed out that, apart from enforcing the hu-
man rights directly against a private party through statutory or common-
law based actions, a litigant bring may, in some cases, also have the 
option of suing the state. Section 7(2) of the Constitution enjoins the state 
112 Fnl02above79. 
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to protect the rights in the Bill of Rights. South African Courts have held 
that the state may be held responsible for violations committed by non-
stare actors. In Carmichele v Minister oj SaJety and Security and Another,'" 
the Constitutional Court, while noting that the state has the duty not to 
perform any act that infringes rights, stated that '[i]n some circumstances, 
there would also be a positive component which obliges the State and its 
organs to provide appropriate protection to everyone through laws and 
structures designed to afford such protection'. 115 It was held in this case 
that South Africa has a duty in international law 'to prohibit all gender 
based discrimination that has the effect or purpose of impairing the 
enjoyment by women of fundamental rights and freedoms and to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to prevent the violation of those 
rights' . lib Furthermore, it was held that the police were one of the primary 
state agencies responsible for the protection of the public in general, and 
women and children in particular, against the invasion of their fundamen-
tal rights by perpetrators of violent crime." 1 As a result, it was held that a 
recommendation by the police to release on bail a person accused of 
rape, who had a history of assaults. could give rise to state responsibility 
for the assault committed by the accused person while on bail. The case 
was referred back to the High Court for trial. Similarly, in Modder East 
Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery: President oj the RSA v Modderklip Boerd-
ery,: 18 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the state had breached the 
duty to proteCl the rights of a farm owner by failing to provide squatters, 
who had occupied a private farm, with land. 
As noted earlier, international human rights law uses the standard of 
due diligence as a measure of state compliance with the duty to protect. 119 
'Due diligence' relates to the question whether the state has taken meas-
ures that are 'reasonable' or 'serious' to prevent the violation."o The Con-
stitutional Court in Carmichele adopted a similar test, by holding that the 
state will be liable for an infringement of a constitutional right by a non-
state actor if it fails to take 'reasonable and appropriate measures' to pre-
vent it. :21 Under this standard, therefore, it may not necessary to have 
recourse to the rules of attribution of conduct to the state, such as those 
evolved under the doctrine of state action, in order to find the state respon-
sible for violations of constitutional rights that occur in the private sphere. 
The upshot of this discussion is that our law has surpassed the con-
stitutions of the US, Canada, and Germany as far as the application of 
114 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) CCarmichele'). 
I 15 Ibid par 44, 
I 16 Ibid par 63 (emphasis added). 
117 Ibid. 
I 18 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) This decision was upheld by the Constitutional Court albeit 
on a different basis, namely the right to an effective remedy. The Constitutional Court 
held that by failing to carry out the evictions. the state had failed to ensure that the 
farm owner had an effective remedy. See President oj the Republic oj South Africa & 
Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
I 19 See Velasquez Rodriguez v Hondura (fn 26 above). 
120 Ibid pars 174 &. 177. 
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constitutional rights to private disputes and non-state actors is concerned. 
In South Africa, direct constitutional actions may not be brought to en-
force the obligations of non-state actors in relation to these rights, as is 
the case in Ireland. This has been wrongly interpreted to mean that con-
stitutional rights only have indirect horizontal application to private law 
and private disputes in the same way that basic rights operate in German 
constitutional law. This view point is a significant come-down from the 
promise of section 8(2) of the Constitution, which explicitly recognises 
that provisions of the Bill of Rights may bind natural and juristic persons, 
and underestimates the breadth of the powers given to courts in sec-
tion 8(3) regarding the application and development of the law to give 
effect to constitutional rights. As has been argued above, section 8(3) 
offers greater potential for considering human rights in private litigation 
than is the case with the German doctrine of Drittwirkung. The high 
watermark of Khumalo, it has also been submitted, is that it restores the 
significance of sections 8(2) and (3). 
7 CONCLUSION 
This article has shown that comparative constitutional jurisprudence does 
not strictly follow the traditional position that constitutional rights do not 
bind non-state actors or that they have no relevance to private relations. 
Rather, it demonstrates a growing trend towards the recognition of the 
horizontal application of these rights. The extent of and bases for this 
recognition differ. Some constitutions, such as those of the US and Can-
ada, are traditional in the sense that they do not generally recognise 
positive direct obligations engendered by constitutional rights. These 
constitutions tend to deny the application of human rights to non-state 
actors. However, courts of these countries have found it difficult to justify 
this denial in all circumstances. 
US courts, through the doctrine of state action, have subjected constitu-
tional rights to the conduct of non-state actors, where it can be shown that 
there is some state connection to the private conduct. It can therefore 
be said that these courts, to this limited extent, acknowledge that non-
state actors are indirectly bound by human rights. Canadian courts have 
experienced particular difficulty in maintaining the public/private distinc-
tion in the application of constitutional rights. On the one hand, the 
Canadian Supreme Court held in Dolphin Delivery that Charter rights have 
no application to the common law in private litigation, unless some gov-
ernmental connection to the issues at hand can be established. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court held, in the same case, that Charter values 
are relevant to private disputes. This jurisprudence arguably lacks consis-
tency because the public/private distinction in the application of human 
rights to private conduct is difficult to defend conceptually. What is impor-
tant to note for our purposes is that, despite its inclination to the conven-
tional position, Canadian courts have acknowledged that private actors 
can, in certain circumstances, be bound by constitutional rights indirectly. 
This could be where the common law is considered in the light of Charter 
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recognition of the duty. to protect human rights, which. if fully embraced, 
will lead [0 a reconsideration of Dolphin Delivery. The recognition of 
this duty. as defined in international law and other domestic jurisdictions, 
such as Ireland and Germany, might require courts to intervene to pro-
tect panies to private litigation from violations of their rights by other 
parties. 
The jurisprudence arising from the constitutions of Germany. Ireland 
and South Africa recognises that non-state actors are bound by constitu-
tional rights. In Germany, this recognition has occurred through the 
doctrine of Drittwirkung, which posits that basic rights influence the 
development of private law. The cases decided by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court effectively establish that basic rights have a strong indirect 
effect on private actors. Failure by a court [0 consider a basic right in 
private litigation amounts [0 a dereliction of duty on the part of the court. 
which entitles the aggrieved party to apply to the Federal Constitutional 
Court to set aside the decision of that court. This doctrine, as noted earlier 
in this article, has received wide acceptance and has been adopted by. 
among others, the European Court of Human Rights and many courts in 
many countries including Italy. Spain, Switzerland, and Japan. 
While the Irish Constitution does not contain an explicit provision allow-
ing for the horizomal application of consti£utional rights. its article 40(3) 
provides that the state has a duty [0 'defend and vindicate personal rights 
of the citizen'. Irish courts have construed this provision to mean that 
non-state actors are bound by constitutional rights. They have thus al-
lowed constitutional claims alleging violations by these actors of these 
rights. However. such constitutional claims are admissible only in those 
cases where common law remedies are inadequate or non-existent. 
Where reliance is placed on a common law action to address a human 
rights violation. the courts may also develop that law to give full effect to 
the right complained of. 
The South African Consti£ution shares similarities with the German and 
Irish Constitutions but is unique. Unlike the German and Irish Con-
stitutions. the South African Constitution expressly states that non-state 
actors can be bound by consti£utional rights depending on the nature of 
the right and the duty in question. In addition. it expressly recognises that 
the judiciary is bound by these rights. However. in order to enforce a 
constitutional right against a non-state actor. the claimant has to bring a 
common law or statutory action. Where statutory law is non-existem. 
inadequate or ineffective to address that human right in issue, courts are 
enjoined [0 apply the common law or [0 develop it in order to give effect 
[0 that right. These are very broad powers, and the fact that no direct 
constitutional claims can be brought to enforce the obligations of private 
actors in relation to constitutional rights should not be seen as claw-back 
clause on the explicit recognition in the Constitution of the horizontal 
application of these rights. Furthermore. it should not be interpreted to 
mean that the Constitution mandates a limited role for constitutional 
rights in private litigation - that of indirectly influencing the development 
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